Gordon (1974) on the ineffectuality of British Policy

the ineffectuality of British policy remains an impenetrable puzzle. After all, neither Grey nor Asquith the prime minister had overlooked the multitudinous danger signs hinting at German aims over the years. Just the reverse; the major premise of Grey’s diplomacy ever since coming to office, in 1906, had been to avoid a situation in which Britain might face a German menace without any allies. Hence the ententes with France and Russia; hence, too, the reinforcement of ties, especially to France, including recurring staff talks since late 1905 and the important naval arrangements of 1912. These were weighty moves, which nudged Britain away from isolation and toward alliance relationships. Why, accordingly, did the Liberal government not pursue more rigorously the logic behind the effort to reorient British policy? Why settle for a dangerous half-way adjustment, which went far enough to entail uncertain commitments and so a limitation on British freedom, but which stopped short of a full-fledged alliance that might have created both an effective control over French policy and an effective deterrent to German belligerence?’ The answer is to be found, of course, in places outside the scope of the traditional model-in domestic politics, especially the resistance to a reoriented policy on the part of the radical wing within the Liberal party and cabinet. A courageous campaign of reeducation might have reduced the ranks of the resisters; the Foreign Office, for one, had long thought so and advised accordingly. Michael R Gordon, Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Case. Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun., 1974), pp. 191-226

A spiral of apprehension shook British life in repeated waves after 1900; invasion scares, scares about imperial disintegration, scares even about the quality of the British “race,” abounded.24 Nor were fears about encirclement a German monopoly. Recurringly, after 1880  British policy makers were haunted by the specter of a hostile coalition. 25 Given these trends, might not the traditional logic of statecraft point to a reversal of policies? Should i-t not have been British policy makers who were rash and desperate, determined to stave off decline in a bold showdown struggle, and German policy makers who were increasingly buoyant, increasingly confident that their nation was riding a glorious wave of history? Michael R Gordon, Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Case. Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun., 1974), pp. 191-226